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Abstract
This note corrects an error in the statement and proof of Propositions 9 and 10 of [C. Cross,
Nonmonotonic inconsistency, Artificial Intelligence 149 (2) (2003) 161–178]. Both results turn out
to depend on the postulate of Consistency Preservation.
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In [1] I developed the formal theory of a nonmonotonic counterpart of logical incon-
sistency: a defeasible property representing internal conflict of an inductive or evidential
nature within a set of statements. Among the results asserted in [1] are two claims (Propo-
sitions 9 and 10) which address the question of how easy it is to find instances of non-
monotonic consistency, i.e., failures of nonmonotonic inconsistency. Proposition 9 states
that if reflexivity (RNC) for nonmonotonic consequence holds then every maximally con-
sistent set is nonmonotonically consistent. Proposition 10 states that if RNC holds, then so
does the principle of “optimism” (OptNI) for nonmonotonic inconsistency.
In a personal communication Professor David C. Makinson of King’s College London
provided a counterexample to Proposition 9 and identified an error in the proof of Propo-
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sition 9 that amounts to a tacit assumption of the principle of Consistency Preservation
(CP). The counterexample goes as follows: letting  be two-valued truth-functional con-
sequence, define the consequence relation |∼ so that X|∼p for all sentences p and all sets
X of sentences. Then RNC holds and all sets are nonmonotonically inconsistent, including
all sets maximally consistent relative to . This counterexample shows that Propositions 9
and 10 must be weakened (see below). Proposition 20 does not require reformulation but
should now cite Proposition 9 (Corrected) instead of Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 (Corrected). If RNC and CP hold, then for all X, if X is maximally consis-
tent relative to , then X|∼ .
Proof. Assume RNC and suppose X is maximally consistent relative to . Assume for
reductio that X|∼ . Then there exist Y1, Y2 ⊆ Cn(X) and p such that Y1|∼p and Y2|∼¬p,
where X|∼p iff X|∼¬p. By the Negation Completeness of maximally consistent sets,
p ∈ X or ¬p ∈ X, but not both. Since p ∈ X or ¬p ∈ X, it follows by RNC that X|∼p
or X|∼¬p. Since X , it follows by CP that not both X|∼p and X|∼¬p. Thus X|∼p iff
X|∼¬p, which contradicts the fact that X|∼p iff X|∼¬p. 
Proposition 10 (Corrected). If RNC and CP hold, then so does OptNI.
Proof. Assume RNC, CP, and X . By Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there is a Y such that
X ⊆ Y and Y is maximally consistent relative to . By Proposition 9 (Corrected), Y |∼ . 
Based on Propositions 9 and 10 (Corrected), I offer the following revision of the sum-
mary [1, p. 177] of properties of nonmonotonic inconsistency for certain extant systems of
nonmonotonic consequence:
• Default logic
◦ with normal or non-normal defaults: WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI
◦ with normal defaults only: OptNI, SupNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI, StrongCMNI
• Poole systems
◦ with or without constraints: WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI
◦ without constraints: OptNI, SupNI, Weak TRNI, WeakCMNI, StrongCMNI
• Preferential entailment
◦ classical: WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI
◦ complete classical stoppered: OptNI, SupNI, WeakTRNI, WeakCMNI, StrongCMNI
Finally, note that Propositions 9 and 10 (Corrected) do not show that CP is a necessary
condition for OptNI. Indeed, the fact that the proof of Proposition 9 (Corrected) makes no
use of Y1 and Y2 suggests that something weaker than the conjunction of CP and RNC may
suffice for OptNI.
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